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Nicholas Mays,  
John Marney and Erin King
New Zealand’s health and long-term care system plays an 
important role in society by improving the length and quality 
of people’s lives and providing dignity for the sick and infirm. 
It also accounts for a significant proportion of government 
spending and a rising share of national income. This article 
discusses some of the challenges that New Zealand faces in 
managing expenditure growth and repositioning its health 
and long-term care system to deal more effectively with 
changing patterns of disease. 
Fiscal Challenges and  
Changing Patterns of Need  
Overview of the current system
As a proportion of GDP, New Zealand’s 
health expenditure is slightly above 
average for OECD countries (Figure 1). 
In 2011, total health expenditure in New 
Zealand was 10.3% of GDP compared 
to the OECD average of 9.3%. In dollar 
terms, New Zealand spends slightly less on 
health per person than the OECD average, 
and less than many of the countries we 
compare ourselves to, such as the United 
Kingdom and Australia. 
A small but significant proportion of 
health expenditure relates to long-term 
care. This includes services provided 
to people with an enduring physical or 
mental disability who are dependent 
on assistance with the basic activities of 
daily living, such as washing, dressing or 
using the bathroom. It may also include 
lower-level assistance with activities such 
as housework, meals or shopping. Long-
term care accounts for around 18% of 
total public spending on health care 
services, being split about equally between 
residential care and home care, plus a 
small proportion spent on day care. Taken 
together, public and private spending on 
long-term care in New Zealand stands at 
approximately 1.4% of GDP, close to the 
OECD average (Figure 2). 
The need for health and long-term 
care (its timing, duration and intensity) is 
unpredictable at an individual level, and 
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the costs can be very high. Some form of 
public or private risk pooling is therefore 
generally considered desirable. Although 
private insurance can play this role to 
some extent, the market tends to cater 
poorly for certain groups, notably the 
elderly, the chronically ill and those on 
low incomes. Individuals at greater risk 
of poor health, who are typically on lower 
incomes, face higher insurance premiums 
where insurers are able to identify them. 
Insurers also tend to restrict eligibility to 
people with no pre-existing conditions, 
limiting coverage.
This creates a strong case for 
government involvement and has led 
to significant public financing of health 
and long-term care services in all OECD 
countries. In New Zealand, public 
expenditure accounts for 83% of total 
health spending (Figure 3) and 92% 
of spending on long-term care (Figure 
2), above the OECD average. Even in 
the United States the government pays 
around half of all health care costs, and 
less than 10% of the population aged 65 
or over holds private cover for the costs 
of long-term care.
How the system performs
New Zealand performs well on many 
commonly-used indicators of overall 
population health. For example, life 
expectancy has improved from 71.1 years 
in 1961 to 81.2 years in 2011, around one 
year higher than the OECD average 
(OECD, 2013). However, it is difficult to 
get an accurate picture of the performance 
of the health system from these high-level 
indicators. Health care is just one of a 
number of factors that influence health 
status. Tobias and Yeh estimate that health 
care contributed around one third of the 
health gains made by the New Zealand 
population over the 1981–2004 period 
(Tobias and Yeh, 2009). Other relevant 
factors include individual characteristics 
through to wider socio-economic, cultural 
and environmental conditions (Figure 4). 
Certain indicators relate more directly 
to the performance of the health system. 
The concept of ‘amenable mortality’, for 
example, refers to deaths that should not 
have occurred given effective and timely 
care. There is no firm consensus about 
the list of causes for amenable mortality, 
so estimated rates vary. According to 
two recent estimates, age-standardised 
mortality rates in 31 OECD countries 
in 2007 ranged from from 59 to 200, 
or from 62 to 206, deaths per 100,000 
people, depending on the list used. In 
both cases, the amenable mortality rate 
in New Zealand (85 or 107 deaths) was 
close to the OECD average (95 or 104 
deaths), and had declined by more than 
the OECD average over the 1997–2007 
period (Gay et al., 2011).
Avoidable hospital admissions provide 
an indication of how well the health system 
is working. We have low admission rates 
for uncontrolled diabetes, at less than a 
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Figure 1: Total health spending as a percentage of GDP, and GDP per capita 
in OECD countries (2011)  
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Figure 2: Long-term care expenditure in OECD countries (percentage of GDP, 2008) 
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Figure 3: Public expenditure on health, % total expenditure on health 
(2011 or nearest year)  
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fifth of the OECD average, but high rates 
for both asthma and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease – in both cases at 1.6 
times the OECD average (OECD, 2011). 
In addition, people with below-average 
incomes are almost twice as likely to 
forgo medical care due to cost as those 
with above-average incomes (Figure 5). 
Rates of some infectious diseases 
are high in New Zealand compared to 
other developed countries and seem to 
be increasing. There are clear ethnic and 
social inequalities in infectious disease 
rates (Baker et al., 2012). A number 
of other health indicators also show 
disparities in health between ethnic 
groups. The gap between Mäori and 
non-Mäori life expectancy at birth is 
7.3 years, although this has narrowed 
from 9.1 years in 1995–97 (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2013a). Rates of avoidable 
hospital admission for Mäori and Pacific 
people are significantly higher than the 
overall rate (about double for Pacific 
people), suggesting that access barriers 
are greater for these groups (Ministry of 
Health, 2012a). 
Increases in health care spending
Government spending on health and 
long-term care is an important part of 
New Zealand’s long-term fiscal challenge 
because it is both large and growing. 
Vote Health accounts for more than a 
fifth of core Crown expenditure, and 
spending has been increasing faster than 
national income for most of the last 60 
years (Figure 6). The amount spent by 
government on these services has risen in 
real terms from $583 per person in 1950 to 
$2,987 per person in 2011 (2011 dollars). As 
a share of GDP, that equates to an increase 
from 3.1% in 1950 to 6.9% in 2011. This 
reflects an increase in both the volume of 
services and the benefits provided, as well 
as higher unit costs. 
Spending on health and long-term 
care is driven by a range of interacting 
demographic and non-demographic fac-
tors. Population ageing affects spending, 
since older people tend to need more care. 
The contribution of population ageing to 
past spending growth has, in fact, been 
quite small: in the international litera-
ture, estimates range from 6.5% to 9% of 
the total over the period 1960–1990 (Dor-
mont, Grignon and Huber, 2006; OECD, 
2006; Smith, Newhouse and Freeland, 
2009). Figure 7 compares the estimated 
contribution made by population ageing 
to total real health expenditure growth 
(excluding long-term care) in New Zea-
land with the averages across the OECD 
and BRIICS countries (Brazil, Russia, In-
Figure 4: The main determinants of health  
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Figure 5: Unmet care need due to cost in eleven OECD countries  
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dia, Indonesia and South Africa) over the 
period 1995–2009.
Ageing is likely to make a larger 
contribution to future spending increases, 
particularly in areas such as long-term 
care, but its overall impact is still expected 
to be modest. A large proportion of 
health care costs come at the end of life 
(costs of dying, rather than from being 
old per se). In the US, older people 
generate over a quarter of their Medicare 
expenditure in the last 12 months of their 
lives (Riley and Lubitz, 2010), which 
equates to approximately a third of their 
lifetime health care costs. These costs are 
deferred by increased longevity. There 
is also evidence that the costs of death 
decline as age at death increases (Bardsley, 
2012). These factors will tend to reduce 
the contribution that population ageing 
makes to health spending growth. 
If increases in longevity are 
accompanied by an increase in the 
number of years lived in good health, this 
should also help to offset demographic 
cost pressures to some extent. The 
international evidence for this is mixed, 
with recent analyses not able clearly to 
predict whether dependency levels by 
age will rise, fall or remain constant 
as life expectancy increases (European 
Commission, 2012). It may be that 
increased longevity results, at least partly, 
from a decline in the rate at which 
chronic diseases progress, which may 
also cause the proportion of life spent 
with serious illness or disease to stabilise 
or reduce even as the proportion spent 
with moderate or less severe conditions 
expands. Under this scenario of ‘dynamic 
equilibrium’, the costs associated with 
providing people with more years of care 
may be partially offset by a reduction 
in the average level of support required 
(Graham et al., 2004).
A country’s health spending is 
statistically highly dependent on its GDP 
per capita, regardless of institutional or 
other characteristics (Mendez, Tabish and 
de Ferranti, 2012). This is shown in Figure 
8. One explanation for this is that higher 
incomes drive higher public expectations 
of the range and quality of health services 
that should be available and, in a broad 
sense, a greater willingness to pay for 
these. The strength of this relationship is 
uncertain. Older studies tend to suggest 
that health care is a luxury good, with 
demand increasing faster than income 
(elasticity greater than one). More 
recent studies have suggested a weaker 
causal relationship, although one that 
is nevertheless significant (European 
Commission, 2012; de la Maisonneuve 
and Martins, 2013). 
As national income rises, so does the 
cost of labour, which is the major input 
into health and long-term care services. 
Productivity gains tend to be relatively 
low in labour-intensive service industries 
such as this. The difference between 
economy-wide productivity (and wage) 
growth and the anticipated lower rate 
of productivity growth in the health 
and long-term care sector is expected to 
push up unit costs over time. This effect 
– known as Baumol’s cost disease – is a 
major driver of the Treasury’s projections 
for rising expenditure over the long term 
(Treasury, 2013).
Evidence about the rate of public 
sector productivity growth is limited. 
Statistics New Zealand recently released its 
first productivity series for the ‘healthcare 
and social assistance industry’ (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2013b). Figure 9 shows 
Figure 7: Average real annual change in health spending (1995-2009)
Source: de la Maisonneuve and Martins, 2013 (Table 1); excludes long-term health spending
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Figure 9: Health care and social assistance productivity indexes  
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changes over time in the productivity for 
this industry over the period 1996–2011. 
By way of comparison, Figure 10 shows 
changes in the productivity index for the 
whole measured sector (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2013c). Figure 9 shows strong 
productivity growth in the health care 
and social assistance industry between 
1997 and 2001 (about 20% over the period, 
or 3.7% a year). The decline in labour 
and multi-factor productivity during the 
period 2001–03 reflects slowing output 
growth and strong growth in labour input 
(particularly in hospitals and residential 
care). Overall, between 2001 and 2011 
labour productivity fell by 2.4% (0.24% a 
year over the period, but with variations 
in the rate and direction of change over 
time). The health care and social assistance 
industry covered by these statistics is broad, 
including both market and non-market 
activity in a range of different sectors. 
Factors affecting productivity will vary 
across the sector and changes in quality 
may not be fully captured (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2013b). 
The contribution made by 
technological change to expenditure 
growth is complex (Smith, Newhouse 
and Freeland, 2009; Thomson et al., 
2009). New technologies can reduce 
costs through efficiency gains, or 
through health improvements that 
reduce the need for further care. They 
can also contribute to higher costs by 
extending the scope and range of possible 
treatments, making treatment easier and 
thereby reducing treatment thresholds, 
or by replacing cheaper technologies. 
Medical innovations may contribute to 
rising costs if people live on to develop 
other health problems which themselves 
require expensive treatment. 
Based on past growth and assump-
tions about the drivers of future 
expenditure, the Treasury has projected 
publicly-financed health and long-term 
care spending to 2060, using its long-
term fiscal model (Treasury, 2013). The 
projections show spending continuing 
to rise as a proportion of both national 
income and government expenditure, to 
11.1% of GDP by 2060 (Figure 11), or 31% 
of all government spending excluding 
debt financing costs (Figure 12). These are 
projections, not forecasts or predictions. 
Their purpose is to allow for a better 
understanding of the scale of the fiscal 
pressure that future governments may 
face, as a starting point for thinking 
about the sustainability of existing 
arrangements. 
Changing patterns of disease
Demands on the health system are 
changing. While people are living longer 
and are healthier than their equivalents 
in earlier decades, many are living with 
long-term or chronic conditions that 
are costly to manage. The bulk of these 
conditions are accounted for by non-
communicable diseases (NCDs). These 
include diabetes, cardiovascular disease, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
Source: Statistics New Zealand, 2013c
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Figure 10: Productivity indexes for the measured sector as a whole
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many cancers, dementia and arthritis. 
Globally, the prevalence of and share of 
morbidity that is attributable to NCDs 
is rising as communicable (infectious) 
diseases decline in importance as causes 
of death and morbidity. 
The 2011/12 New Zealand Health 
Survey (Ministry of Health, 2012b) 
provides detailed information about 
the prevalence of chronic conditions. 
Arthritis, asthma and chronic pain each 
affect more than one in ten New Zealand 
adults (15%, 11% and 16% respectively). 
Five per cent of adults have been 
diagnosed with ischaemic heart disease. 
Sixteen per cent of adults take medication 
for high blood pressure, and 10% for high 
cholesterol (in both cases, a higher rate 
than in 2006/7).
The diabetes rate has increased 
gradually over the last 15 years, with 
around 5% of adults now diagnosed with 
this condition, and a further 2% of adults 
estimated to have undiagnosed diabetes 
(Ministry of Health, 2012b; Coppell et al., 
2013). Diabetes is more prevalent among 
overweight and obese people and among 
Mäori, Pacific and Indian ethnic groups 
(Figure 13). The prevalence of diabetes 
also increases with deprivation. It is likely 
that the variation in the prevalence of 
diabetes among ethnic groups is linked 
to deprivation and obesity. As well as 
generating health problems in its own 
right, diabetes is a risk factor for later 
strokes and heart disease. 
A fact that has only been fully 
appreciated fairly recently is that many 
people with long-term conditions 
suffer from more than one. In a recent 
Commonwealth Fund international 
health care survey of adults with complex 
health care needs, 34% of New Zealand 
respondents reported two or more 
conditions (Schoen and Osborn, 2011). 
The health systems of developed 
countries are typically not well adapted to 
meet the needs of people with long-term 
conditions effectively and at reasonable 
cost. They tend to be organised to deal best 
with acute, life-threatening conditions, 
based around hospital-focused, doctor-
led services. Care tends to be episodic, 
reactive and delivered by individual 
professionals working in parallel. Patients 
tend to be regarded as passive recipients of 
care, and their contribution to designing 
and providing their own care tends to be 
under-valued, along with the role of their 
informal carers. 
Traditionally, health systems have been 
organised around individual medical 
specialties and the management of single 
conditions. There is a growing consensus 
that health care systems need to be 
reoriented and rebalanced to respond 
better to the changing pattern of need, so 
that they foster professional team-working 
and closer relationships between provider 
organisations, support patient self-care, 
and place greater emphasis on preventing 
long-term conditions developing in the 
first place. 
Avoidable hospital admissions
The centre of gravity of the New Zealand 
health system needs to continue to shift 
away from acute care. Hospitals are costly, 
and admission is in itself frequently 
harmful, particularly in the case of older 
people with complex, multiple conditions. 
Over a third of older people admitted to 
hospital leave in a worse functional state 
than when they were admitted (Edwards, 
2012). 
It is important to note that simply 
shifting services from acute hospitals to 
community settings may not be reliably 
cost-saving (Sibbald, McDonald and 
Roland, 2007). In order for such a policy 
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Figure 13: Prevalence of diabetes in the New Zealand population
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to be successful, it is critical to select the 
correct services, retain the right level 
of hospital provision (which may be 
difficult to estimate), and avoid simply 
transferring costs to patients. A number 
of New Zealand studies show that a 
substituted primary care-driven service 
can, on occasion, be as effective as but 
cost considerably less than the same 
intervention delivered in a hospital setting 
(Wellingham et al., 2003; Barker, Bryant 
and Aish, 2006). Less is understood 
about how a health system as a whole 
would perform (in terms of demand 
for hospital care and in financial terms) 
if significantly more care was delivered 
outside a hospital environment.
Most high-income countries have 
taken some steps in this direction, 
although experience has shown how 
hard it is to reduce hospital admissions 
in practice and hospital care remains an 
essential element in these systems. In part 
this is because any freed hospital capacity 
has to be taken out of use for savings 
to be realised and this can be politically 
very difficult. A sustained process of 
change is required, with less reliance on 
hospitals and doctors, more specialist 
nurses working outside hospitals, more 
flexible staff working practices, and more 
joint decision-making by primary and 
secondary (specialist) clinicians. 
Integration of health and long-term care
The health and long-term care system 
needs to be considered as a whole, rather 
than as two parallel, separate systems. 
For example, a recent study in England 
showed (Figure 14) that people in care 
homes made significantly less use of 
all forms of hospital care than other 
social care users, including people using 
intensive home care (Bardsley et al., 2012). 
New Zealand shows a comparable pattern 
of use. Frail people receiving high levels of 
support in their own homes use hospital 
services more than those in residential 
care, although their total costs of care tend 
to be lower (Grant Thornton, 2010).
The policy implications of this sort of 
research are not straightforward, but it is 
clear that the health and long-term care 
sectors affect one another. This points to 
the need for these services to be managed 
as complements and substitutes, with 
coordinated planning at the service 
delivery level to promote health and 
independence at least long-term cost. 
Those with long-term conditions should 
be supported by multidisciplinary teams, 
operating outside hospitals, which 
include not just health workers but also 
social care providers.
New Zealand has an advantage in 
this regard because its health budget at 
national level covers both acute services 
and long-term care. Public funding for 
aged residential care is allocated to district 
health boards (DHBs) alongside funding 
for health care and is not ring-fenced. 
In principle, therefore, it is possible 
for DHBs to design care packages that 
include both health and support services, 
with a view to minimising costly hospital 
admissions. In many countries this would 
involve complex negotiations across 
separate commissioning and delivery 
organisations. On the other hand, there 
are coordination issues even in New 
Zealand, since around half of all long-
term care (mainly for disability support 
services for the under 65s) is managed 
centrally by the Ministry of Health. 
Residential care for the over 65 is 
subsidised by DHBs, subject to an asset 
test. The rationale for asset-testing 
is targeted allocation of resources, 
particularly as people typically expect 
to draw down capital during retirement. 
Since 2005 the asset test has been 
substantially relaxed, with the threshold 
for a single person rising from $15,000 
to more than $213,000. This relatively 
generous approach has narrowed the 
disparity between health services that 
are ‘free’ at the point of use and means-
tested long-term care. This reduces the 
incentive for hospital care to be used 
inappropriately and inefficiently. It also 
means that tax revenue is being used (up 
to a point) to protect accumulated capital 
and, in effect, facilitate future bequests by 
some people in long-term care. 
Purchasing arrangements
DHBs function both as planners and 
commissioners of services for the 
population and as owner-operators of 
district hospitals. This arrangement 
weakens their incentives in the short to 
medium term to reduce dependence on 
hospital care since they would have to 
manage the consequences for jobs and 
hospital income. It is notable that the 
most sustained local efforts to improve 
care for people with complex long-term 
conditions have been in places such as 
south Auckland where the senior clinicians 
and managers of the local hospital 
recognise that there is no possibility of 
continuing to provide an adequate health 
care system without reducing dependence 
on the hospital and improving care 
outside it.
The OECD has suggested that the 
role of DHBs as purchasers should be 
strengthened through greater operational 
separation of their dual functions (OECD, 
2009). A split between purchasers and 
providers appears to perform well when 
there is potential for competition between 
providers, when providers are not tied 
to specific purchasers, when uncertainty 
and complexity are low, and when few 
economies of scale apply (Figueras, 
Robinson and Jakubowski, 2005). New 
Zealand’s small size and geographically-
dispersed population mean that these 
conditions will often not be met. 
Furthermore, good services for people 
with long-term conditions require 
coordination of care from a range 
of different providers and types of 
professionals, rather than supplier 
competition for individual services. The 
The OECD has suggested that the role of DHBs 
as purchasers should be strengthened through 
greater operational separation of their dual 
functions (OECD, 2009). 
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case for a simple separation is stronger 
for services such as elective surgery, where 
purchasers can choose between several 
providers and it is easier to see how 
encouraging competition could improve 
quality and efficiency of care. 
The potential contribution of primary 
health organisations as purchasers to 
improving the allocation of resources may 
also need to be considered. Their budgets 
do not include large parts of primary care 
expenditure, such as primary medical 
pharmaceuticals and diagnostics. This 
limits their ability to shape services and 
means there is a lack of clarity about where 
responsibility for primary care ultimately 
resides. General practices continue to 
operate largely separately from the rest of 
the public system through a combination 
of patient co-payments and capitated 
subsidy. This funding model restricts the 
extent to which preventive and chronic 
care programmes can be integrated into 
mainstream general practice. 
In 2009 the Ministry of Health invited 
expressions of interest for what was 
termed ‘Better, Sooner, More Convenient’ 
(BSMC) health care, with the aim of 
providing extended primary care closer 
to where people live and reducing the 
demand for secondary care (Ministry of 
Health, 2009). The programme includes 
initiatives to co-locate a wider range of 
primary and community health services 
in the form of integrated family health 
centres. Nine initiatives were selected by 
the Ministry of Health and funded as 
demonstration programmes (Ministry 
of Health, 2011). The Health Research 
Council recently awarded a number of 
partnership grants to evaluate some of 
the initiatives. At this stage, however, it 
is difficult to gauge whether progress is 
being made and in which areas. Although 
there is some positive anecdotal evidence, 
so far there has been no independent, 
national evaluation of the programme. 
There are currently 20 DHBs 
operating as purchasers of health services, 
as well as the Accident Compensation 
Corporation and around 30 primary 
health organisations. There may be scope 
to rationalise these arrangements, by 
moving to fewer purchasers with clearer 
lines of accountability. As well as reducing 
administrative costs, this would allow for 
more systematic planning of services and 
investment, at both national and local 
level. It would also help to concentrate 
management expertise within the system. 
The case for fewer purchasers is further 
strengthened if governments prefer 
national consistency in service provision 
over local variation.
A new requirement for groups of 
DHBs to develop regional service plans 
has been introduced to encourage 
collaboration and service integration, 
although this has added to rather than 
streamlined planning and accountability 
arrangements for DHBs. At a sub-
regional level, three DHBs in the lower 
North Island (Hutt Valley, Wairarapa and 
Capital and Coast) have gone further 
and merged their planning and funding 
functions with a view to improving the 
financial and clinical sustainability of 
their operations (CCDHB, 2013).
Patient/user-directed care
User-directed arrangements for long-
term care are fairly common overseas. The 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
the United States all allow care recipients 
to directly employ their personal care 
assistants, while a number of Nordic 
countries operate voucher systems to 
promote personal choice in the use of 
long-term care. In Austria, all support for 
home-based care is provided in cash, with 
the recipient being able to decide whether 
or not to purchase formal care. Germany 
and Luxembourg give people entitled to 
long-term care a choice between benefits 
in kind or a cash payment set at a lower 
level (OECD, 2005). Small numbers of 
younger disabled people in New Zealand 
currently have access to individual care 
budgets. 
These funding models are intended to 
increase consumer direction and choice. 
This can have a number of different 
objectives, including empowerment of 
care users and a better fit between people’s 
needs and their care packages. Another 
objective is to stimulate competition 
amongst providers, based on user choice, 
with a view to improving quality and/
or reducing costs. These arrangements 
may also raise the visibility of the cost of 
services and increase public understanding 
of the need for prioritisation. 
Critics argue that the evidence in 
favour of individual health and long-term 
care budgets is weak and that they are 
likely to increase inequalities in care by 
favouring better-off and more educated 
users. In the Netherlands there appears to 
have been a loss of spending control over 
personal budgets, with claims increasing 
tenfold and spending more than fivefold 
between 2002 and 2010 (van Ginneken, 
Groenewegen and McKee, 2012). This has 
been attributed to raised expectations of 
what could be provided and difficulties 
setting reliable budgets at an individual 
level (White, 2011). 
Studies in some OECD countries have 
suggested that such arrangements can 
increase user satisfaction at similar cost 
to traditional models, provided they are 
properly targeted, although there seems 
to have been less impact on the quality 
of care (Lundsgaard, 2005). The concept 
has been the subject of a randomised 
trial in England in relation to social care 
(disability support). This showed some 
positive results. Those with budgets 
seemed to have slightly better outcomes 
than those without, although relative 
cost-effectiveness varied by patient sub-
group (Glendinning and Moran, 2008).
More recently, evaluations of the use 
of both personalised care planning and 
personal budgets in the United Kingdom 
have been published as part of a series of 
studies looking at health system reform 
... the evidence in favour of individual health and 
long-term care budgets is weak and ... likely to 
increase inequalities in care by favouring better-
off and more educated users.
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under the Labour government of 1997–
2010 (Mays, 2013). Care planning was 
intended to link support and services 
provided by multiple providers to people 
with chronic conditions through a process 
of shared decision-making between the 
patient and a named professional. Take-
up was modest and there was no sign 
that the level and nature of the planning 
that took place had any impact on health 
outcomes after six or 12 months of 
follow-up (Bower, 2013). Personal health 
budgets were associated with statistically 
significant improvements in the quality 
of life and psychological well-being of 
recipients, although there did not appear 
to be an impact on health status or 
mortality rates over the 12-month follow-
up period. The cost of inpatient care was 
lower for people with personal budgets, 
but this was offset by higher spending 
on other services, with no significant 
impact on overall costs. Budgets were 
nevertheless assessed as being cost-
effective given assumptions made about 
the value of, in particular, quality of life 
improvements (Jones et al., 2013).
‘Telehealth’ involves the remote 
exchange of information between patient 
and professional in order to help manage 
a condition. ‘Telecare’ is the remote 
monitoring of changes in a person’s 
physical status using alarms and sensors. 
Both have been widely promoted as 
ways of enhancing self-management 
and improving the quality and cost-
effectiveness of care for people with 
long-term conditions. These technologies 
have been slow to move into routine use 
due to a mix of professional and patient 
resistance. They seem to be viewed 
ambivalently by patients (Lehoux, Saint-
Arnaud and Richard, 2004; McCreadie 
and Tinker, 2005). Evidence for their cost-
effectiveness outside rural areas is also less 
than compelling (Barlow et al., 2007). In 
the largest and most robust randomised 
evaluation undertaken to date, a 
programme in England has so far shown 
no significant reduction in hospital costs, 
still less overall net savings. However, there 
does appear to have been a reduction in 
hospital admissions and mortality rates 
during a 12-month follow-up period 
among a group of patients with chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, diabetes or 
heart failure (Steventon et al., 2012). 
The health workforce
As noted earlier, productivity gains tend 
to be relatively low in labour-intensive 
service industries such as health care. 
Better use of information technology may 
provide one way of maximising labour 
productivity within the health sector. 
Telehealth and telecare are examples of 
this, although their impact to date has 
been limited. Another approach may be 
to adjust the skill mix of the workforce to 
ensure that professional skills are put to 
best use. As doctors are most costly and 
require the greatest amount of training, 
allowing other professionals such as 
nurses and pharmacists to perform some 
of the tasks previously performed by 
doctors, or creating new roles, could create 
efficiencies. The role of physician assistant, 
for example, has been used in the United 
States since the 1960s. Physician assistants 
are trained for a considerably shorter time 
than doctors and receive lower salaries. 
However, in primary care settings it has 
been shown that they have a ‘same task’ 
substitution ratio of 0.86 compared with 
the supervising physician, meaning that 
they saw the same types of patients and 
rendered the same care as the physician 
86% of the time (Hooker, 2006). New 
Zealand is currently in the second phase 
of a physician assistant demonstration 
project focused on primary care and rural 
hospital settings. 
Workforce issues must be considered 
in the context of an international labour 
market in which there is likely to be 
increased demand for health professionals 
over the coming decades. New Zealand’s 
health workforce has high levels of 
inward and outward migration. In 
2005/06, foreign-born doctors and nurses 
made up 25% and 29% of the workforce 
respectively (Zurn and Dumont, 2008).
Prevention
Government programmes for health 
promotion and disease prevention 
currently represent around 6.4% of health 
care spending in New Zealand, compared 
to an average of less than 3% for OECD 
countries. There are many different kinds 
of preventive measure and they vary in 
cost-effectiveness. Some programmes – 
such as vaccination against communicable 
diseases – are highly effective (OECD, 
2010) and can even be cost-saving 
(Maciosek et al., 2006). Others, especially 
those requiring behavioural change, can 
be difficult to implement and costly. Even 
when preventive measures are effective 
in terms of improving health outcomes 
(and may therefore be worthwhile), 
they may not necessarily save money for 
government in the long run. There is no 
guarantee that programmes delivered 
across broad population groups will be 
less expensive than subsequent targeted 
care, and people who live longer as a 
result may also develop other conditions, 
generating further costs. 
Another approach to secondary 
prevention and cost containment involves 
risk-profiling. The basic idea is simple: 
to identify and intervene pre-emptively 
with those in the population who are at 
greatest risk of developing or exacerbating 
an existing long-term condition such as 
diabetes. While such approaches may seem 
common sense, only a small minority 
of preventable, unplanned hospital 
admissions are of people who are at high 
risk based on their previous behaviour 
Government programmes for health promotion and 
disease prevention currently represent around 
6.4% of health care spending in New Zealand, 
compared to an average of less than 3% for OECD 
countries.
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and characteristics. As a result, risk 
profiling may not be cost-effective unless 
the intervention triggered is low-cost. 
More work needs to be done to investigate 
the effectiveness of risk-profiling followed 
by different interventions for patients at 
different levels of risk of admission or 
readmission.
As noted above, health care is just 
one of a number of factors that influence 
health status. This means that in some 
cases it may be that the most effective 
interventions to keep the population 
healthy and out of hospital are found 
outside the health system. For example, 
New Zealand has relatively poor-quality 
housing. More efficient heating (in 
particular, through better insulation) can 
reduce cold and damp, improving health 
by reducing infectious and non-infectious 
disease and related hospitalisations. Two 
randomised controlled trials in New 
Zealand have shown that retrofitting 
insulation and installing non-polluting 
heaters in homes are potentially effective 
ways of improving the health of occupants, 
thereby reducing the number of GP visits 
and hospitalisations, days off school or 
work, and premature deaths (Howden-
Chapman et al., 2007; Howden-Chapman 
et al., 2008; Chapman et al., 2009).
The scope of the public system
Greater efficiency and better prevention 
are important, but fiscal pressures will 
remain. As discussed earlier, wages are the 
main cost input for health and long-term 
care services, and they tend to rise as the 
economy grows. Scope for productivity 
gains is limited in service sectors and 
typically will not compensate entirely for 
these higher wage costs. This means that 
the cost of delivering a given amount of 
care tends to rise over time.
This does not mean that good-quality 
care will become unaffordable, since 
‘productivity growth makes a society 
wealthier, not poorer, and able to afford 
more of all things’ (Baumol, 2012). 
However, the extent to which spending 
continues to rise as a proportion of 
GDP depends on the choices we make 
as health and long-term care services 
become relatively more expensive. If we 
do decide to devote a greater proportion 
of our future income to buying these 
services, they will form a larger part of 
the national economy. We will thus need 
to consider how much of this enlarged 
activity should remain within the public 
sector, and how far it can or should be 
funded by government through taxation. 
Governments make decisions about 
the coverage of the public health system 
that influence spending growth. Health 
services in New Zealand (as in many 
OECD countries) are mostly provided 
free at the point of need, although 
there are co-payments for GP visits 
and prescription medicines. The cost of 
certain services, including optometry and 
most adult dental care, has to be met 
privately. The scope of the public system 
is also defined, less directly, through 
centrally-imposed budget constraints, 
which may lead to rationing of services 
through waiting lists, and perhaps to 
reductions in quality. These parameters 
may be adjusted over time. 
Health technology assessment is a 
process by which health purchasers decide 
which new health technologies are worth 
investing in and is now widely used by 
OECD countries (OECD, 2010). It is most 
well developed in the pharmaceutical 
sector. New Zealand’s Pharmaceutical 
Management Agency (PHARMAC) is a 
highly successful example of what can 
be achieved through good prioritisation. 
PHARMAC decides which GP-prescribed 
medicines, hospital medicines and 
vaccinations are to be subsidised by 
government, assessing them against a 
range of economic and clinical criteria. 
This approach aims to ensure that 
New Zealanders get the maximum health 
benefits from a given pharmaceutical 
budget. PHARMAC estimates that its 
activities saved DHBs more than $5 
billion from 2000 to 2013. It is currently 
in the process of expanding its operations 
to cover medical devices, which will yield 
further savings to DHBs.
Changes to the coverage of the 
public system, including decisions about 
prioritisation, may involve difficult trade-
offs in terms of fairness and efficiency. 
For example, co-payments may lower 
the cost to government of a particular 
service and, through price signals, reduce 
overconsumption. However, because 
individual contributions are not related 
to income or ability to pay, except perhaps 
at the margins, they tend to be regressive 
and may deter people from accessing 
services when they need them. They may 
also contribute to inefficiency. In New 
Zealand, co-payments do not apply to 
hospital services (a previous attempt to 
introduce them having been strongly 
resisted). This difference may cause some 
patients to forgo primary care in favour 
of accident and emergency services, with 
a higher cost to government and no 
better outcomes. Patient co-payments 
have also been identified as an important 
barrier to refocusing the health system 
so that chronic conditions are effectively 
managed in the primary care sector (Mays 
and Blick, 2008). People who do not 
access care initially because of cost may 
eventually require more costly inventions 
that could otherwise have been avoided.
Restricted coverage for the public 
system would lead to an increased reliance 
on out-of-pocket payments or private 
insurance, with more people choosing to 
purchase additional health care or faster 
access. While this happens now to some 
extent, concerns about equity and access 
could be expected to increase if the types 
of services available to people on different 
incomes, or with different risk profiles, 
started to diverge significantly.
New Zealand achieves good health indicators at a 
level of spending per person that is slightly below 
the OECD average, although there are some areas 
of concern, including infectious disease rates and 
ethnic disparities in health. 
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Growth in the private insurance 
market may generate fiscal pressures of 
its own. Policies which cover co-payments 
can increase demand by insulating people 
from the cost of services, and have been 
found to increase public expenditure 
in the United States, France and Spain 
(OECD, 2004; WHO, 2004). Private 
insurance may also create new incentives 
for providers to use the public system 
to stimulate demand for private services 
(Thomson et al., 2009). This has led to 
a regulatory response in a number of 
countries. Canada, Sweden, Luxembourg, 
Greece and Italy all prohibit doctors from 
practising in both the public and private 
sectors.
Other countries have tried to manage 
financial pressures by introducing com-
pulsory insurance schemes, particularly 
in relation to long-term care. These 
generally involve publicly-managed 
social insurance arrangements rather 
than compulsory private insurance. 
The accident compensation scheme 
provides an analogous model in New 
Zealand. Compulsory insurance and 
other hypothecated taxes may have 
presentational advantages relative to other 
forms of taxation, but they also conflate 
decisions about tax and spending. A 
hypothecated levy is still effectively a tax, 
funding current or future expenditure, 
and may be a less efficient and more 
complicated way of raising revenue than 
other forms of taxation. 
Concluding remarks
Health and long-term care spending 
is projected to grow considerably over 
the next 50 years, driven upwards by 
a combination of factors. All OECD 
countries are facing similar pressures, so 
this is not an indication of system failure in 
New Zealand. New Zealand achieves good 
health indicators at a level of spending per 
person that is slightly below the OECD 
average, although there are some areas 
of concern, including infectious disease 
rates and ethnic disparities in health. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that rising 
expenditure on health and long-term 
care will constitute a significant fiscal and 
political management issue for future 
governments. The demands on the system 
are changing, with chronic and long-term 
conditions increasingly important as a 
source of morbidity. This has important 
implications for the organisation and 
delivery of care. The system needs to 
continue to be rebalanced away from acute 
care, with a greater emphasis on reducing 
hospital admissions and managing 
conditions in primary care. Even if this is 
achieved, there will still be difficult choices 
about how much of New Zealand’s future 
income is devoted to health and long-term 
care, what proportion of total spending is 
financed from taxation, and how to adjust 
the contours of the public system in 
response to fiscal pressure. Action will be 
needed on a range of fronts to ensure that 
New Zealanders get the greatest health 
gains from every dollar spent and that 
health spending growth is sustainable for 
future generations.
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